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NATURE OF CASE 
This is a judicial review of the Decision of the Board 
of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah denying un-
employment compensation benefits to approximately 1,300 
claimants for the period of April 1, 1979, through April 14, 
1979. 
DISPOSITION OF BOARD OF REVIEW 
By a 2-1 vote the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission denied unemployment compensation to all categories 
of the approximate 1,300 claimants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioners seek to reverse the devision of the Board of 
Review to allow unemployment compensation benefits to all 
categories of claimants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Petitioners are approximately 1,300 claimants who are 
represented in Utah by the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers 
of America, Locals 222 and 976. The claimants are employees 
of Interstate Motor Lines ("IML"), Consolidated Freightways 
("CF"), Garrett Freightlines ("Garrett"), Illinois-California 
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Express, Inc. ("ICX"), and Pacific Intermountain Express 
("PIE"). (R. 000111 to 00024). These employers, with East 
Texas Motor Freight ("ETMF"), Rio Grande Motorway ("RG"), 
and Sundance Transportation, Inc. ("Sundance"), are represente: 
in Utah by the Intermountain Operators League, an employer's 
union. 
For a number of years the Teamsters and the Intermountain 
Operators League have been parties in their respective 
representative capacities to a collective bargaining agreement 
called the 1976-1979 National Master Freight Agreement. 
(R.00027). This national agreement generally regulates the 
terms and conditions of all phases of employment between the ! 
employers signatory to the agreement and their respective 
employees. The 1976-1979 National Master Freight Agreement 
expired by its own terms at midnight, March 31, 1979. 
On December 11, 1978, in accordance with the provisions 
of the 1976-1979 National Master Freight Agreement, the 
Teamsters notified the Intermountain Operators League that 
it desired to revise or change certain terms and conditions 
of the National Master Freight Agreement effective April 1, 
1979. (R.00027 and R.00068). Then, Teamsters Locals 222 and 
976, as well as other teamsters locals in the United States 
authorized the National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee 
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT") in 
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Washington, D.C., to act as their collective bargaining 
agent (R.00027). Likewise, the Intermountain Operators 
League consisting of the employers here involved, and approximately 
11,000 other trucking firms in the United States, authorized 
Trucking Management, Inc. ("TMI") to act as their collective 
bargaining agent. (R.00063 to R.00067). 
Collective bargaining proceedings between IBT and TMI 
for a new 1979-1982 National Master Freight Agreement began 
on January 23, 1979, in Washington, D.C. (R.00027). One 
purpose the IBT engaged in early collective bargaining 
proceedings was to avoid a strike or lockout. (T.00141) 
The United States Government through the President's economic 
advisor Alfred Kahn, Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service, and the Interstate C0tmnerce Commission, actively 
particpated in the collective bargaining proceedings. 
(T.00141) According to the testimony of Grant Scott Haslam, 
who participated in the collective bargaining proceedings, 
the United States Government threatened deregulation and 
denial of rate increases unless IBT acceded to TMI's economic 
demands. (T.00142). Frank Fitzsimmons, told a press conference 
on April 2, 1979, that Alfred Kahn and Barry Bosworth of the 
Council of Wage and Price Stability "played a major role in 
causing our strike." R.00076) As March 31, 1979, approached, 
the IBT determined that TMI was negotiating in bad faith and 
had no intention of reaching an agreement by or on March 31, 
1979 (R.00101). 
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For example, TMI proposed during the late evening hours 
on March 31, an economic counter proposal that failed to 
even provide employees an opportunity to recoup losses 
suffered by inflation and that failed to allow owner operators 
cost increases to recover the costs of operating their own 
equipment. (R.00102). 
The IBT believed that TMI was forcing and precipitating 
a national strike. (R.00102) The IBT further believed that 
TMI desired a national strike because such would cause 
President Carter to invoke a Taft-Hartley injunction, which 
would end the strike for the statutory 80 days and maintain 
the lower 1976-1979 agreement rates. (Ibid). 
Therefore, in the early morning hourse of April 1, 
1979, the IBT called a "selective strike" against a few 
employers and not a national strike. (T.00147). This is 
the first occasion where a selective strike had been called 
by the IBT in its history. (T.00149) Only 73 out of 11,000 
trucking firms were struck. (T.00147) Nothwithstanding 
this selective strike, the IBT remained willing to continue 
collective bargaining. (R.00071) In addition, the IBT 
offered "interim agreements" to all employers represented by 
TMI (T.00145). 
Despite IBT's efforts to limit the effect of the strike, 
TMI decided at 1:00 P.M. on April 1, 1979, to engage in an 
industry-wide national lockout of employees (R.00077, R.00059 
and T.00147), and threatened legal action if IBT pursued 
i interim agreements with individual trucking concerns. (R. 000601
1 
I 
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The selective strike, national lockout, and interim 
agreement and TMI's threat will be discussed in more detail. 
Selective Strike. Only 73 out of 11,000 trucking firms 
were struck. The 73 employers struck were determined by 
IBT (R.00123). In Utah, CF, Garrett, ICX and PIE were 
struck. (R.00172). IML was not struck, nationally or in 
Utah. (T.00144). Approximately 600 of the claimants were 
employed by IML.(R.00013 to 00018). The IBT issued strict 
instructions governing the selective strike. (R. 00126). One 
instruction was not to interupt the operations of any employer 
not struck. CF, Garrett and PIE were struck in Utah by 
normal peaceful strike activities in the early morning on 
April 1, 1979. (T.00136). ICX was struck on April 2, 1979. 
(T.00146). 
National Lockout. As stated supra, TMI ordered an 
industry-wide national lockout of all enployees at 1: 00 P .M. 
on April 1, 1979, from Washington, D.C. In Utah, IML, who 
was not struck, locked out its 600 employees at 1:00 P.M. 
on April 1, 1979, in accordance with TMI's order. (T.00167). 
IML innnediately notified its employees not to report to work. 
(Ibid.) CF also locked out its employees and instructed 
its people not to come to work. (T.00164). RD, UP and Sundance 
did not lock out their employees. (T.00147). The Petitioners 
had no control over the decision to lock out or the lock 
out itself. (T.00149). 
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Interim Agreement and Threat. As described supra, the 
IBT offered all employers under the National Master Freight 
Agreement, including those struck, "interim agreements." 
The interim agreement is set forth in full at R.00105. 
The purpose of the interim agreements was to allow employers 
to continue operations during the strike. If signed the 
individual employer would not be struck and all strike activit~ 
would cease. (T.00145). The interim agreement would terminate 
and be superceded upon an agreement between TMI and IBT 
on the terms of the National Master Freight Agreement. (R.001Li 
This allowed employees to work while negotiations continued. 
No employer in Utah signed the interim agreement. (T.00145). 
However, hundreds of trucking firms did sign the interim 
agreement (R.0078 to 00100), allowing their employees to 
continue working. In return, TMI threatened the IBT with 
legal action if the IBT continued with its attempts to soften 
the effects of the strike by offering interim agreements. 
(R.00061). 
The differences between TMI and IBT were settled on 
April 11, 1979, and all strike activity by the Teamsters 
ceased. However, work did not resume until April 14, 1979, 
because of strike activity in progress by the International 
Association of Machinists, Automotive Lodge 1020. (R.00028). 
The IBT or Locals 976 and 222 had no control over this strike 
activity of the Machinists. (T.00156). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE RESPONDENTS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CONDUCT 
OF LABOR WAS THE REAL AND FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF 
THE WORK STOPPAGE RESULTING IN DENIAL OF 
BENEFITS TO ALL CLAIMANTS 
The statute governing an award of unemployment compensation 
benefits is Section 35-4-5(d) of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), which reads in pertinent part as follows: 
An individual shall be inelegible for benefits 
(d) For any week in which it is found by the 
commission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage 
of work which exists because of a strike involving his 
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or 
establishment at which he is or was last employed. 
(1) If the commission, upon investigation shall 
find that a strike has been fomented by a worker of 
any employer, none of the workers of the grade, class 
or group of workers of the individual who is found 
to be a party to such plan, or agreement to foment a 
strike, shall be eligible for benefits ... " 
This statute has been interpreted principally by three Utah 
Supreme Court opinions: Olof Nelson Construction Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952); 
Teamsters, Chauffers, and Helpers of America, Locals 222 
and 976 of International Brotherhood v. Orange Transportation 
Co., et al., 5 Utah 2d 45, 296 R2d 291 (1956); and Teamsters 
etc. v. Board of Review, etc., 10 Utah 2d 63, 348 E2d 558 
(1960). The latter two were decided principally upon the 
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authority of Olof Nelson case which is clearly the seminal 
opinion. Generally these opinions interpret the statute 
broadly. They define the relevant group or class of workers 
by the bargaining unit of which the employee or employer is 
a member, and apply a "volitional test" which disqualifies a 
worker from benefits if his bargaining unit is principally 
responsible for the work stoppage involved. As stated in 
Teamsters etc. v. Board of Review, supra 348 P.2d at 563; 
"In a controversy of this character, the critical issue is 
whether the conduct of labor or of management is the real 
and fundamental cause of the work stoppage." 
The Respondents denied benefits to all categories of 
claimants in the instant action. The denial was based upon 
ten Findings of Fact made by the Appeal Referee (R.00028) 
which were adopted without qualification by the Board of 
Review. (R.00007). There is no factual finding by the 
Respondents concerning who was the real and fundamental 
cause of the work stoppage. The Respondents did, however, 
make a legal conclusion, based upon the Olof Nelson and Orange 
Transportation cases that labor was the volitional cause 
of the work stoppage. (R.00030, 00031). 
The petitioners assert that the real and fundamental 
factual cause of the work stoppage and resulting unemployment 
for all claimants was the conduct of management and the 
government, not labor. 
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The intent of the I.B.T. was to avoid any cessation of 
work. Negotiations for the new 1979-1982 National Master 
Freight Agreement commenced nearly three months prior to 
the expiration of the old contract. One purpose of early 
negotiations was to avoid a strike or a lockout. (T.00141). 
Also,the I.B.T. called a selective strike rather than a 
national industry wide strike. (T.00147). Moreover, the 
I. B. T. offered "interim agreements" to all employers 
represented by T.M.I, who desired to continue operations. 
(T.00145). While no employer in this case signed the interim 
agreement, hundreds of trucking firms did sign and continued 
operations. (R.00061). One purpose of this interim agreement 
was to avoid a work cessation. (T.00145). There was no intent 
of the I.B.T. to strike prior to the late evening hours of 
March 31, 1979. (T.00148). Accordingly, it should be clear 
that the intent of the I.B.T. was to avoid any work cessation. 
The cause of the selective strike is clear. The Petitioners 
were the sole party producing any evidence on this issue. 
The cause of the selective strike was the bad faith bargaining 
by T.M.I (in violation of 29USC 158d) and government 
interference in the collective bargaining processes. 
According to the Affidavit of Robert Babtiste, attorney for 
the I.B.T. and negotiator, which was admitted into evidence: 
"3. The union negotiators were forced to call. 
a strike during the early morning hours of April 
1, 1979, against only 73 employers out of.the 
approximately 11,000 employers who were signatory 
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to this Agreement. The Union Negotiating 
Committee also directed all of our members 
employed by carriers not selected for s~r~ke 
action to continue to work and not participate 
in any strike activity. To the best of our 
knowledge, our members complied with these 
instructions and continued to work. 
4. It was obvious to the union negotiators 
and the undersigned that the industry was bargain-
ing in bad faith and had no intention of reaching 
an agreement on March 31 in order to avoid a 
strike. The industry negotiators presented to the 
union negotiators at the last possible moment during 
the late evening hours of March 31, an economic coun-
ter-proposal that failed to allow our members to 
recoup their losses suffered during the inflationary 
spiral since their last increase which occurred one 
year before, a refusal to agree to proposals to 
improve safety on the job and a refusal to agree to 
increase the economic situation of the owner-
operators to a point to which they could at least 
recover the cost of operating their equipment .. 
5. It was obvious to the union negotiators 
that the industry negotiators were attempting by 
their obviously inadequate counter-proposal to 
precipitate a strike by the unions. They assumed 
that such a strike would be nation-wide in scope, 
as it was in 1976 at the expiration of the prior 
Agreement. In the event of a nation-wide strike, 
the industry negotiators assumed, based upon 
President Carter's earlier statements to this effect, 
that the federal government would immediately seek 
and secure a Taft-Hartley injunction ending the 
strike for the statutorily prescribed 80 days. 
However, the federal government did not move to 
enjoin our limited, selective strike. 
6. During the afternoon of April 1, the Execu-
tive Committee of Trucking Management, Inc., the 
main bargaining association for the industry, met and 
voted to lock out all of our members. The association 
took this action in order to precipitate a nation-
wide stoppage of truck transportation which would 
create a crisis situation that would force the fed-
eral government to seek a Taft-Hartley injunction 
to restore trucking services to the nation. Another 
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major trucking industry association 
(Motor Carrier Labor Advisory Council) 
refused to join in this lockout of our 
members. Fortunately, the federal govern-
ment correctly assessed the motive behind 
the lockout and deferred its decision to seek 
a Taft-Hartley injunction." (R.00101 to 
(R.00103). 
Mr. Babtiste's testimony is confirmed by the press conference 
verbatim report by Frank E. Fitzsimmons dated April 2, 1979, 
(R.00076). Mr. Fitzsimmons, commenting on the right to 
free collective bargaining under the Wagner Act, stated at 
this press conference, "Alfred Kahn and Barry Bosworth of 
the Council on Wage and Price Stability have totally disrupted 
these negotiations and it can be fairly said that they played 
a major role in causing our strike." (Ibid). In these 
negotiations of course, management and government asserted 
that labor abide by President Carter's Voluntary Wage and 
Price Guidelines of 7%. (R.00059). Labor was unwilling, in 
light of the reports on corporate profits and a 13.4% 
annual inflation rate. 
The Respondents produced no evidence on the cause of 
the selective strike. There is no evidence that the selective 
strike was a strike against all employers. In fact, the 
interim agreements offered by the I.B.T. is inconsistent 
with that concept. 
As a result of the I.B.T. 's calling of a selective 
strike, Teamster Locals 222 and 976 struck P.I.E, Garrett 
and C.F. in Utah on April 1. C.F., as discussed~. 
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also engaged in a lockout. On April 2, 1979, Teamster Locals 
222 and 976 struck I.C.X. and E.T.M.F. I.M.L. was not 
struck. 
The employer union, represented by T.M.I,, retaliated 
strongly. At 1:00 P.M. on April 1, 1979, T.M.I. instructed 
all employers to shut down their operations and lock out 
its employees. (R.00077, R.00059, and T.00147). This was 
not a selective lockout which could have occurred; rather 
it was an unwarranted escalation of work cessation by calling ' 
for a national industry-wide lockout. Further, T.M.I. 
threatened legal action if I.B.T. pursued interim agreements 
with employers. (R.00060). The Appeal Referee, in Finding 
No. 9, specifically found that I.M.L. ceased its operations 
in response to directives from T.M.I. So did C.F., 
although C.F. had been struck earlier. 
In conclusion on this point, the facts are clear that 
the real and fundamental cause of the selective strike and 
lockout was management and goverrnnent. All categories of 
of claimants should be awarded unemployment compensation 
benefits. 
POINT TWO 
THE RESPONDENTS ERRED BY DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO THOSE EMPLOYEES LOCKED 
OUT BY THEIR EMPLOYERS AND ESPECIALLY 
THOSE LOCKED OUT BY I.M.L. 
As set forth supra, T.M.I. strongly reacted to I.B.T. 's 
announcement of a selective strike. It denounced the interim 
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agreements and ordered a national industry-wide lockout. 
The Petitioners assert that the calling for a national 
lockout, rather than a selective lockout, was an unwarranted 
escalation of economic warfare resulting in the cessation 
of work for thousands of employees nationwide. In Utah 
both I.M.L. and C.F. locked out their employees. I.M.L. 
shut out approximately 600 employees immediately by calling 
them personally by telephone and instructing them not to 
report to work. (T.00167). C.F. also called its employees 
and told them not to report to work. (T.00164). There are 
approximately 600 I.M.L. claimants and 400 C.F. claimants 
in this proceeding. 
I.M.L. was not struck. C.F. was struck on April l, 
but hours later management locked out its employees. 
As to those two categories of claimants, and especially 
the I.M.L. claimants, the real and fundamental cause of 
their cessation of work was management, not labor. Olof 
Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra; 
and Teamsters v. Board of Review, supra. 
The actions of T.M.I. in engaging in an industry-wide 
lockout, rather than a selective lockout, constituted an 
unwarranted escalation of economic warfare - - - the responsibility 
of which cannot be placed upon the I.M.L. claimants by 
denying unemployment compensation benefits. The cause of 
these claimants unemployment was T.M.I. 's decision to lockout. 
The responsibi:ity for the cessation of work must rest with 
management. Many employees, such as R.G., U.P. and Sundance 
refused to lock out their employees. (T.00147). Sp nsored by the S.J. Q inney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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POINT THREE 
THE RESPONDENTS VIOLATED PETITIONERS EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
IN DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
The Petitioners respectfully submit that the disquali-
fication provisions of Section 35-4-5(d) U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, and the particular "volitional test" employed by 
the Appeal Referee and the Board of Review violates the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. The Appeal Referee and the 
Board of Review declined to address the constitutional issues 
raised by the Petitioners. (R.00026 and R.00007). These 
issues were reserved as " . . . a matter for the courts to 
decide." (R.00030). 
The type of hearing required by the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions must be "meaningful," Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L.Ed. 2d 62, 66 85 S.Ct. 1187 (1965), 
and "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L.Ed 
I 865, 70S.Ct. 652 (1950). Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment! 
requires there be some rational basis for any presumptions I 
concerning qualification or disqualification for unemployment 
benefits. Turner v. Department of Empilioyment Security 
U.2d , 531 P.2d 870, ~· 96 S.Ct. 249, 423 U.S. 44, 
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46 L.Ed. 2d 181, 184 (1975). Lastly, the Equal Protection 
Clause does not allow statutory differentation of classes 
based on criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of 
that statute. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 
30 L.Ed. 2d 225 (1971). "A classification must be reasonable 
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike." (Ibid.) 
The objectives of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.S. 
Section 503(a)(l) and Utah's corresponding Utah Employment 
Security Act. 35-4-1 et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as amended, 
must accordingly be considered. In respect to the Social 
Security Act, "The objective of Congress was to provide a 
substitute for wages lost during a period of unemployment 
not the fault of the employee." California Human Resources 
Dept. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130, 28 L.Ed 2d. 666, 91 S.Ct. 
1347 (1971). The objectives of Utah's Act is also unambiguous. 
"It is clear from this language that the primary purpose 
of such an act is to provide protection for employees; it 
is not the direct or primary purpose of such legislation 
to control or regulate the relationship of employer and employee." 
Abramsen v. Board of Review, 3 U.2d 389, 284 P.2d 213, 216 
(1955). "Its purpose is remedial to protect the health, 
morals and welfare of the people by providing a cushion against 
the shocks and rigors of unemployment." Singer Sewing 
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Machine Co. v.Industrial Commission, 104 U. 175, 134 P.2d 
479, 485 (1943). 
The public policy of the State of Utah vis-a-vis labor 
is also important to consider. Illustrative of this policy 
is Section 34-20-1 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. In pertinent 
part, this section provides: 
" 
(1) It recognizes that there are three major 
interests involved, namely: that of the public, 
the employee, and the employer. These three 
interests are to a considerable extent interrelated. 
It is the policy of the state to protect and promote 
each of these interests with due regard to the situ-
ation and to the rights of the others. 
(2) Industrial peace, regular and adequate 
income for employee, and uninterrupted production 
of goods and services are promotive of all of 
these interests .... 
(3) Negotiation of terms and conditions 
of work should result from voluntary agreement 
between employer and employee. . . . " 
The decisions of the Appeal Referee and the Board of 
Review violated the abov.e constitutional principles and 
statutory objectives in a number of direct and indirect 
ways. 
First, the Respondents based their decision to deny 
benefits on an improper conclusion or presumption by using 
the volitional test. By doing so, benefits were denied 
to employees out of work through no fault of their own. 
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It should be noted that the volitional test is a judicial 
invention expoused in the Olof Nelson case and not found in 
Utah's disqualification statute, Section 35-4-S(d). There 
are several factors for this creation. One was that the 
Court in Olof Nelson confronted multi-employer-union disputes 
for the first time. Also, Utah's disqualification statute 
does not provide for eligibility during a lockout; yet, 
benefits should be provided when the unemployment is not 
the fault of the employee. The Court in Olof Nelson then 
discarded any geographical criteria (as called for distinctly 
by the Statute) and focused on "involvement." The Court 
then adopted the volitional test to determine qualification: 
responsibility for the work stoppage is allocated to the 
party who created its actual and directly impelling cause. 
Utah Courts have continued this test until today. 
In the Olof Nelson case, the A.F. of L. was bargaining 
on behalf of member craft unions with the Association of 
General Contractors (A.G.C.) when a deadlock in negotiations 
occurred and the A.F. of L. selectively struck two of the 
A.G.C. employers, and the entire membership of the A.G.C. 
responded by shutting down all projects. The Industrial 
Connnission initially granted an award of benefits to those 
employees who were not involved geographically in the original 
two strikes. The Supreme Court reversed the holding: 
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... There is no dispute that the economic 
sanction of the A.F. of L. in this case was 
directed against the entire employer association. 
The strike was called for and on behalf of every 
employee covered by the agreement. It therefore 
involved all these claimants, at each particular 
place of employment at which they were last em-
ployed . id at 243 P.2d 959. 
The fact that the selective strike "involved" the employers 
not struck was a determining factor. 
The same result occurred in Teamsters , etc. v. Orange 
Transportation, etc., supra, when the union selectively 
struck members of the employer bargaining unit which responded I 
by effecting a general shutdown of all operations. The 
Court found this economic sanction was directed against the 
entire employer group and the purpose of the selective 
strike was to force acceptance of union demands. 
In the Teamsters etc. v. Board of Review, supra, case 
the claimant workers were allowed benefits but only upon a 
finding that the work stoppage began with a strike by workers 
who were not members of the claimants bargaining group. 
As a result of these and other cases, the prevailing 
law in Utah allows a worker benefits who becomes unemployed 
because of a labor dispute if he was locked out by his 
employer through no fault of his own. However, no benefits 
are allowed if the lockout was induced by a selective strike 
which may be fairly considered as a strike againstall. 
Even then, a worker can qualify for benefits if the work 
stoppage is a strike that was compelled by the employers' 
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bad faith bargaining. In the Olof Nelson opinion, for 
instance, the court discussed the California case of Bunny's 
Waffle Shop v. California Employment Comm., 24 Cal. 2d 735, 
151 P.2d 224, 227. The employers there did not commence a 
lockout but instead cut wages and imposed longer and split 
shifts in response to a trade dispute. The employees responded 
by calling a general strike. They were determined by the court 
to be qualified for unemployment benefits since the work 
stoppage was not truly voluntary on the worker's part. The 
Olof Nelson opinion, also quotes the case of McKinley v. 
California Employment Stabilization Comm., 34 Cal. 2d 239, 209 
P.2d 602, as follows: 
... in reality, the form of the cessation of employ-
ment is not controlling and the determinative factor 
is the volitional cause of the work stoppage. In 
other words, although the employees left work of their 
own choice, that choice was not freely made but was 
compelled by the economic weapon which the employers 
used. This is the only sound and fair way to apply 
the subjective volitional test id at 243 P.2d 
957. 
This "subjective volitional test" is not part of any statute 
but was created by the California courts in the cases cited 
above and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court for application 
to our statute in the Olaf Nelson case. 
The respondents utilized this volitional test in denying 
the claimants benefits in this case. There was no factual 
finding of fault or actual cause of unemployment. Thus an 
assumption or presumption is permitted that has no rational 
basis in fact. The assumption or presumption inherent in the 
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volitional test is that a party against whom any economic 
action is directed has the absolute right to retaliate in 
full economically by creating a complete work stoppage, 
either by an employer's lockout or a union's strike. This 
assumption or presumption gives legal credence to the principhl 
that "a strike against one is a strike against all. " No 
doubt this principle has merit in the context of collective 
bargaining strategy. However, this principle has no merit 
in the context of determining eligibility for unemployment 
compensation benefits. The assumption applies regardless of 
the degree of economic action the first party inflicts. The 
assumption allows a party against whom any economic action 
I 
I 
is directed to escalate the economic war, disturb the industira1 
peace, destroy regular and adequate income for employees 
without any fault, and interrupts the production of goods 
and services. Moreover, the direct cause of the cessation 
of work, which causes unemployment, becomes irrelevant after 
any party cotmnences any economic action. Under the volitional 
test there can be only one culpable cause of cessation of 
work. In reality there may be several causes for cessation 
of work at various places of employment, some disqualifying, 
others not. This is especially true in a multi-employer 
bargaining unit involving numerous unions. 
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Collective bargaining processes of today, which involves 
general and selective strikes and lockouts, requires more 
individualized treatment. Turner v. Department of 
Employment Security, supra. The volitional test is based 
upon an assumption or presumption having no rational basis 
in fact, and as such violates due process of law, Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (1971); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L.Ed. 
2d 551 (1972); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 
L.Ed. 2d 965, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (1963), and does not allow a 
meaningful hearing. Armstrong v. Manzo, supra. A more 
rational approach may be to shift the burden of proof to an 
employer to justify any general lockout called in response 
to a selective strike. 
No fault should be attached to the employees who became 
unemployed due to the general lockout in the present con-
troversy. They stood ready and willing to work and yet were 
deprived of their work and public assistance. 
The locked out employee stands in no different position 
than an employee who is laid off. They both are unemployed 
because the employer ceased work through no fault of the 
employee. Yet the locked out employee is is denied benefits 
provided the similarly situated worker solely because of his 
membership in a union. This discrimination due to union 
membership violates the employee's tightly guarded "Section 
7 Rights" as guaranteed by 29 U.S.C. Section 157 of the 
Wagner Act. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-22-
In short, the disqualifying provision and the volitional 
test fails to be reasonable, is arbitrary, and rests upon 
some ground of difference not having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed, 
supra. 
Second, the disqualifying section as applied by the 
volitional test offends the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses by being totally insuseptable to definition or proof. 
To begin with, the opinions which created this test provide 
no guidelines to determine what the subjective intent of 
a multi-employer association or a labor organization might 
be. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, how can an 
individual worker who has the burden of proof, or even his 
union, acquire competent evidence for the courts in Utah 
of the events which transpired in the bargaining sessions in 
Washington, D.C. The sessions were not public and were con-
ducted by a few industry leaders. Because of this lack of 
definition and impossibility of proof, the disqualifying 
provision imposes a burden that denies these claimants due 
process of law by not providing any meaningful hearing. Arm.st~ 
v. Manzo, supra. 
Third, this also violates the public policy of the 
State of Utah, i.e., promoting industrial peace, regular 
and adequate income, and uninterrupted production of goods 
and services. In the present action, the I.B.T. was forced 
to call a strike. It called a selective strike for rather 
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benign reasons. Utah's disqualifying provision as applied 
under the volitional test, which gives irrebutable sanctity 
to the "strike against all" concept, encourages rather 
than discourages industry-wide strikes. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of the employee applicants, especially those who 
were locked out by their employers, should be eligible 
for unemployment compensation benefits. Utah's disqualification 
statute 35-4-5(d) U.C.A. (1953), the volitional test 
employed in this case operated to deprive the Petitioners' 
rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
to the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
The disqualifying provision as applied under the 
volitional test denies benefits to employees out of work 
through no fault of their own. The Olof Nelson and Orange 
Transportation cases provide automatic sanction to an employer 
association's economic threat that "a strike against one is 
a strike against all." This strike against all reasoning 
permits an employer to escalate a labor dispute, create a 
stoppage of work, and unemployment without any fault on 
behalf of the employee. Yet, the employee is denied appro-
priate benefits. 
A more rational and practical approach to the multi-
employer bargaining situation has been adopted by the Courts, 
For example in MEMCO v. Maryland Employment Security 
Administration, 280 Md 536, 375 A.2d 1086 (1977), the Court 
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of Appeals of Maryland considered the "strike against 
all" concept in a multi-employer bargaining setting. The 
Court noted that the Maryland Statute disqualified claimants 
only if the labor dispute existed at the plant or premises 
where he was last employed. In refusing to adopt the 
"strike against all" concept, the Court held that the individua: 
place of employment, not a multi-employer association, was 
the relevant entity for purposes of determining whether a 
labor dispute was the cause of the particular employee's 
unemployment. 375 A.2d at 1092. The language of Utah's 
statute is very similar in this particular context. This 
approach would appear to alleviate the necessity of determining! 
certain impossible issues such as who was justified in taking 
economic action, subjective intent, and so forth in awarding 
or denying benefits. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
LITTLEFIELD, COOK & PETERSON 
426 South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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